Nepotism, Incentives and the Academic Success of College Students by Gevrek, Deniz & Gevrek, Zahide Eylem
IZA DP No. 3711




























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study
of Labor
September 2008 
Nepotism, Incentives and the Academic 




University of Southern Mississippi 
and IZA  
 
Z. Eylem Gevrek 





Discussion Paper No. 3711 






P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post World Net. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 
















This study investigates the role of self-employment statuses of parents on their children's 
college success and post-graduation plans by using a unique data set from a private 
university in Turkey. We assembled the data set by matching college students' administrative 
records with their responses to a survey we designed. Presence of self-employed parents 
has a strong negative effect on college success even after accounting for possible ability 
bias, intergenerational human capital transfers and various individual characteristics. The 
children of self-employed parents are also more likely to have entrepreneurial intent and are 
less likely to plan to attend graduate school. 
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Within the organization of a family, parental in°uence is central in molding a child's
behavior. The occupational and educational choices of the parents may have far-reaching
e®ects not only on their own lives but also on future generations. This study explores
the role of self-employment statuses of parents on their children's college success and
post-graduation plans.1
Previous studies indicate that college success, measured by GPA, is correlated with
factors including individual and family characteristics, social background and individual
discipline (e.g., Betts and Morell [1999]; Irandoust and Karlsson [2002]). None, however,
considers self-employed parents and family businesses as factors a®ecting students' in-
centives to exert e®ort in college. Parental self-employment status and family business
ownership may imply a larger set of post-graduation opportunities for a college student,
but they may a®ect the incentives to obtain additional human capital during college.
According to human capital theory, additional years of education acquired by attend-
ing college add valuable skills to the stock of human capital and increase productivity.
As per signalling theory (Spence [1973]), a college diploma may not add to individual
productivity but has an informational value by signalling innate ability. Either theory
can explain the choice of a high school senior who lacks the safety net of self-employed
parents and a family business to go to college. Students with self-employed parents and
family businesses may also choose to enroll in college to insure themselves against fu-
ture uncertainty about the relative returns to di®erent post-graduation plans. Therefore,
regardless of the availability of a larger set of post-graduation employment options, a
1Our de¯nition of self-employed parents excludes parents with professional occupations such as doc-
tors, lawyers, accountants. We use \self-employed" and \non-professional self-employed" interchangeably.
2rational individual may choose to enroll in college.
When a job requires at least a college degree, years of schooling may lose their signalling
and human capital values for the pool of college graduates. In this case, employers may
focus on other information, such as GPA.2 College GPA may a®ect a student's probability
of ¯nding a job irrespective of signalling ability or acting as a proxy for human capital.
Moreover, an extensive literature substantiates the impact of college GPA and college class
rank on earnings (e.g., Weisbrod and Karpo® [1968], Wise [1975], Ehrenberg and Sherman
[1987], James et al. [1989] and Hamermesh and Donald [2008]). While high college GPA
may be important for a student planning on being a paid employee, a student who is
planning on being self-employed, which may be a®ected by presence of self-employed
parents, may not value college GPA as highly.
Intergenerational transfer of occupations, which is common in many countries, is
well documented by previous literature.3 These intergenerational transfers are especially
strong in self-employment: the children of self-employed parents are more likely to become
self-employed (e.g., Lentz and Laband [1990], Dunn and Holtz-Eakin [2000] an Hout and
Rosen [2000]). One of the widely cited reasons for intergenerational transfers is nepotism
in the form of self-employed parents and family ¯rms employing their children in their
businesses or simply transferring the ownership of businesses.4 These intergenerational
transfers also are possible if self-employed parents help their children to start a new busi-
ness. Self-employed parents may provide non-monetary resources to their children, for
2For instance, in the USJOBS website, the federal government's o±cial one-step source of jobs and
employment information, applicants are asked to report their college GPAs.
3See Laband and Lentz (1983; 1989; 1992) for evidence in the United States; Scoppa (2009) ¯nds that
nepotism may play an important role in intergenerational transfer of public sector jobs in Italy; Kramarz
and Skans (2007) ¯nd evidence for intergenerational transfer of employers in Sweden.
4See Bertrand and Schoar (2006) for an extensive review on the role of families in family ¯rms.
3instance by passing their work experience, managerial human capital, industry-speci¯c
knowledge, and career-speci¯c human capital on to their children.5 Moreover, in the
presence of capital market imperfections, successful entrepreneurs may relax the capital
market constraints on their o®spring by transferring their wealth (Dunn and Holtz-Eakin
[2000]).
As a result, students with self-employed parents and family businesses may exert less
e®ort in college if they anticipate secure jobs and earnings in their family businesses
regardless of their college success. If, in turn, self-employed parents and family businesses
employ relatives with lower levels of human capital, they may incur non-market costs
and put themselves in a less competitive position compared to non-family businesses.
Favoritism of this kind may a®ect the health and success of these businesses and of the
economy.
Recent research on nepotism and ¯rm performance shows that nepotism may be an
important issue in the U.S. economy. P¶ erez-Gonz¶ alez (2006), using data from the CEO
successions of publicly traded U.S. corporations, calculates that 36.4 percent of the these
¯rms' CEO successions involved nepotism. The ¯rms that promote related CEOs sig-
ni¯cantly underperform those that promote unrelated CEOs.6 Also, family CEOs who
attended selective colleges perform better than CEOs who did not.7
We use a unique data set that we constructed by matching information from two
5Lentz and Laband (1990) distinguish between the general occupational skills acquired via college
education and job-speci¯c skills or managerial human capital acquired by experience. Lazear (2004) ¯nds
that among Stanford MBA alumni, the entrepreneurs study a more varied curriculum compared to those
who work as employees.
6Bennedsen et al. (2007) ¯nd a negative impact of related CEOs on the performance of Danish ¯rms.
7A high GPA may strongly predict future productivity as re°ected in the performance of a business.
The lower performance of related CEOs could stem from their lesser e®ort while in school, which previous
studies have not controlled.
4di®erent sources. The ¯rst part comes from a survey we initiated and conducted in
December 2006.8 We surveyed students in the College of Economics and Administrative
Sciences at a major private university in Turkey. The second part of the data set comes
from the con¯dential administrative records of the university. While we are well aware of
the possible uniqueness of the Turkish labor market, the same point could be made about
any national market. Moreover, matching the survey data with students' administrative
records would have been extremely di±cult in the U.S. due to di®erent privacy regulations.
This study investigates the impact of self-employment statuses of parents and post-
graduation employment opportunities in shaping the incentives for college success. The
empirical ¯ndings suggest that self-employed parents and family businesses have a strong
negative e®ect on college students' GPAs, after controlling for demographic characteristics,
ability, college major, and parental education. GPAs of men with two self-employed
parents or only a self-employed mother are the lowest, even after controlling for ability
bias. The impact of self-employed parents on women's GPAs is similar to that of on men's
GPAs only when the only self-employed parent is the father.
We also ¯nd that the children of self-employed parents are more likely to have en-
trepreneurial post-graduation plans. The impact of having only a self-employed father
on future self-employment plans is large, while the impact of having two self-employed
parents on entrepreneurial intent is even larger. Students with self-employed parents are
not only more likely to plan to be entrepreneurs, but they are less likely to plan to attend
to graduate school.
8See survey questionnaire in Appendix C.
5II. Theoretical Model
The objective of this theoretical framework is to understand how the presence of self-
employed parents may a®ect students' future career and e®ort choices while in college.
We use a partial equilibrium model to study systematically the e®ects of self-employed
parents on students' college GPAs. Let us assume an individual lives only for two peri-
ods, goes to school in the ¯rst period and works in the second. In the ¯rst period she
simultaneously makes her post-graduation career choice and determines how much time
to spend in college (attending classes and studying), e, while enjoying the remainder of
her ¯nite time in leisure activities, l = T ¡ e, where T is total time available. Utility in
the ¯rst period is only a function of leisure.
In the second period, with probability (1¡p) the student will work as a paid employee.
In this case, she supplies her labor inelastically and earns y(e), where e is the time/e®ort
she spent in school.9 She consumes all her income, and her second period utility depends
only on consumption.
With probability p, she gets the option to become self-employed. In this case she
can choose between self-employment (SE) or paid employment (PE). In either case she
inelastically supplies her labor in the second period. The di®erence between these careers
is the income they generate. If she chooses paid employment, she earns y(e). If she
chooses self-employment, she earns a stochastic income, ySE, which is independent of e.10
Let ~ u and u be the utility functions in the ¯rst and the second periods. They are twice
continuously di®erentiable, e u 2 C2 and u 2 C2, increasing and concave, e u0 > 0, u0 > 0,
e u00 < 0, and u00 < 0. Because their arguments are in di®erent units (time vs. income),
9y(e) satis¯es the following conditions: y(e) 2 C2; y(e)0 > 0; and y(e)00 < 0.
10This simplifying independence assumption is made to keep the model tractable.
6they may or may not have di®erent forms.
At the beginning of the ¯rst period, after observing individual-speci¯c p, the student
simultaneously makes leisure/e®ort and post-graduation career choices to maximize her
lifetime utility. We can formally state her utility maximization problem as:
max
fe;lg
e u(l) + ¯[pmaxfEu(ySE);u(y(e))g + (1 ¡ p)u(y(e))]
s:t: e + l · T
(1)
If she chooses paid employment, then the optimal e®ort choice e¤











PE) = 0 (2)
If she chooses self-employment, then let e¤
SE be her optimal e®ort choice, which will










SE) = 0 (3)
Equation (3) implies that the optimal e®ort will depend on p if an individual chooses
self-employment. Comparing two otherwise identical students, the one with self-employed
parent(s) is more likely to get the self-employment option. In other words, she is expected
to have a higher p. A higher likelihood of getting the self-employment option for those with
self-employed parents may be caused by sheer nepotism and/or intergenerational transfers
7of entrepreneurial human capital and ability, among other things. It is straightforward to
show that the higher the probability of getting the self-employment option, the lower the










PE for p 2 (0;1): (4)
Given a chance to choose between two options, a student chooses self-employment over
paid employment if the expected utility from self-employment is greater than or equal to
the utility from paid employment, Eu(ySE) ¸ u(y(e)). The likelihood of choosing self-
employment is increasing in the expected utility from self-employment, which depends on
the distribution of the self-employment income. Self-employed parents may increase the
expected utility, Eu(ySE), by providing monetary and non-monetary resources to their
children. For instance, the presence of self-employed parents may reduce the riskiness (in
the sense of second-order stochastic dominance) of the self-employment option.13 In this
case, comparing two otherwise identical students, the child of self-employed parent(s) will
have a larger expected utility from self-employment and therefore is more likely to choose
11Let F = ¡e u0(T ¡ e¤
SE) + ¯(1 ¡ p)u0(y(e¤
SE))y0(e¤





























12Proof: Let us assume that e¤
SE ¸ e¤































PE, then we have e u0(T ¡ e¤




















PE). Proof by contradiction.
13This conclusion is based on the fact that if a random variable Y is riskier than X, i.e. the distribution
of X second-order stochastically dominates that of Y, and if X and Y have the same mean, then E[u(X)] ¸
E[u(Y )] for all concave functions u(.).
8self-employment.
The model provides two empirically testable hypotheses. First, the o®spring of self-
employed parents are more likely to choose the self-employment option. Second, students
with self-employed parents will on average have lower GPAs, because their optimal e®ort
is lower.
III. A New Data Set
The empirical analysis in this study relies on two data sources. The ¯rst part comes
from an in-class survey we designed and administered to students in the College of Eco-
nomics and Administrative Sciences of a private university in Turkey.14 The survey was
conducted in December 2006, spanning a period of three weeks. In order to improve the
survey, we pre-tested it on a group of 20 students from another college in the same uni-
versity. The students of the College of Economics and Administrative Sciences answered
detailed questions about their personal and family characteristics, GPA, scholarship sta-
tus, post-graduation plans, number of younger and older siblings, and family business
characteristics, if applicable.
The second part of the data set comes from the administrative records of all sophomore,
junior and senior students in the College.15 The administrative data contain detailed in-
formation on each student's GPA, gender, age, year in college, Turkish Central University
Entrance Exam score or Student Selection Examination (SSE) score, major, scholarship
status, and parental education levels and occupations. We are able to match the surveyed
14The College of Economics and Managerial Sciences o®ers the following majors: Eco-
nomics, Economics (Honors), Business Administration, Business Administration-Economics, Business
Administration-Economics (Honors), Government, International Relations and International Finance.
15Freshmen are excluded from the sample since their GPAs were not reported by December 2006.
9individuals with their administrative records.
Of the 1,122 sophomores, juniors and seniors in the College of Economics and Ad-
ministrative Sciences, we obtained responses from 499 (44.5 percent). The non-surveyed
sample consists of students who failed to attend class on the day of the survey. The prob-
ability of surveying a student may depend on a student's course load along with other
determinants of attendance, such as the weather and idiosyncratic shocks. Therefore, stu-
dents with heavier course loads are expected to be more likely to appear in our surveyed
sample, because they are more likely to be present in a greater number of classes than
those with lighter loads. The item non-response rate among the surveyed students was
very low, since we monitored students closely and insisted that they respond to as many
questions as possible.
Summary statistics for the entire sample of students (n=1,122), surveyed students
(n=499) and non-surveyed students (n=623) are presented in Table 1. The ¯rst row
shows that the surveyed students have higher-than-average cumulative GPAs on a four-
point scale. Consistent with expectations, the surveyed students take more classes (6.12
per semester) compared to others (5.88 per semester). The surveyed students are slightly
younger, and there are many more female students among the respondents. The surveyed
students, on average, have higher SSE scores. The educational attainment of the parents
is similar for surveyed and non-surveyed students. The average educational attainment
of mothers is 11.55 years, while that of fathers is 13.37 years. Seventy-four percent of
mothers are either housewives, unemployed or retired. This percentage is consistent with
the 25.5 percent labor force participation rate reported by the State Institute of Statistics
based on the 2000 Turkish Household Labor Force Survey.
The distributions of parental occupations for the entire sample suggest that almost
1044 percent of the fathers and 6 percent of the mothers are non-professional self-employed
individuals. Our de¯nition of the self-employed parent category does not include profes-
sionals such as doctors, lawyers, consultants, and accountants, among others. Therefore,
our de¯nition of \self-employed" corresponds to \non-professional self-employed." In the
interest of saving space, we occasionally use \self-employed" instead of \non-professional
self-employed." Tansel (2001) calculates more recent ¯gures for occupational distribu-
tions classi¯ed by urban and rural residence, based on the 2000 Turkish Household Labor
Force Survey. Self-employed men make up 27 and 50 percent of the urban and rural labor
forces respectively, while self-employed women make up 5 and 14 percent respectively.
The occupational distributions of the parents in our sample are thus similar to those of
men and women in Turkey, based on the calculations from Census and Household Survey
data sets.
U.S. self-employment rates are somewhat di®erent from the ones in our sample. For
instance, Fairlie (1999) calculates that the U.S. self-employment rate for whites is 15.23
percent. Hout and Rosen (2000), report a 24.2 percent self-employment rate for fathers,
while Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000) ¯nd that the overall propensities for self-employment
for fathers and mothers are 30 percent and 9 percent, respectively.
Having a self-employed parent does not necessarily imply that the family owns a
business. A family business requires having employees other than self-employed parents.
Of 191 surveyed students who have self-employed fathers, however, only four reported that
their father is the only worker in the business. The rest of these 191 students reported
that their family businesses employed anywhere from two to 1,000 people. Out of these
191 students, 103 of their self-employed parents do not employ non-family members at
11the management level.16
Table 1 shows the distribution of post-graduation plans of the surveyed students.
Sixteen percent of the students plan to work in their family businesses, and four percent
are planning to start a new business. We consider these two groups of students as \¯rst-
degree entrepreneurs." Seven and seventeen percent of the students said that their post-
graduation plans involve either \working as employees ¯rst, and then working for their
family businesses," or \working as employees ¯rst, and then starting a new business,"
respectively. We regard these two groups of students as \second-degree entrepreneurs."
Twenty percent of the surveyed students said that they are planning to work as employees.
Thirty-three percent said that they are planning to go to graduate school, and three
percent said that they have other plans.
Table 2 shows the mother-father matched parental occupation distributions for the
entire sample and the surveyed sample. The upper panel of Table 2 shows that out
of 1,122 students, 499 have non-professional self-employed fathers, while only 64 have
non-professional self-employed mothers. Forty-six students reported having two non-
professional self-employed parents. The lower panel shows that out of 499 surveyed
students, 191 and 28 have non-professional self-employed fathers and mothers, respec-
tively.
A. The Turkish Educational System
In Turkey the only gateway to enter college is by taking the Student Selection Exam
(SSE).17 The SSE score is well accepted as a good proxy for a student's ability. The
16Students with two self-employed parents and those with only self-employed mothers reported similar
family business structures and self-employment patterns to those with only self-employed fathers.
17The Turkish Student Placement Center states that the SSE has two objectives: a) To assure a
12Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2008), states that
SSE measures the basic aptitude of students for university-level study similarly to the
traditional Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) of the College Board in the U.S. To quote
OECD (2008):18 \Neither the Ä OSS, nor the SAT intends to measure what students know
about speci¯c subject matter learned from secondary education. In fact, in contrast to the
subject-related tests that existed before 1999, success on the current Ä OSS is not necessarily
related to a student's mastery of a speci¯c subject area in such as mathematics, natural
sciences or the social sciences." Because the students observed in our sample took the
SSE after 2001, we are fairly con¯dent about using the SSE score as a measure of ability.
The SSE is conducted every year in mid-June.19 In 2006 1,570,357 students took
the test. Public universities had 163,844 spots, while private universities had 24,045
spots. Only 156,120 students enrolled in public universities and 16,111 enrolled in private
universities. In Turkey, public and private universities di®er, especially in tuition and
other fees. Public university tuition costs for the academic year 2006-2007 varied between
$82 and $682, while this private university's tuition is approximately $10,600 per year.20
IV. Impact of Self-Employed Parents on College Success
In this section we test the hypothesis that students with self-employed parents are
balance between the demand for higher education and the number of spots available in higher education
institutions; and b) To select and place students with the highest probability of success in appropriate
higher education programs by considering their preferences and performance on the SSE.
18Ä OSS is the Turkish acronym for Ä O· grenci Se» cme S³nav³, which is translated in English as Student
Selection Exam(SSE).
19See the detailed information on the SSE at this link: \http://www.osym.gov.tr/BelgeGoster.aspx?
F6E10F8892433CFF7A2395174CFB32E15F640FC6104C033D"
20The average tuition for private universities is approximately $10,000.
13expected to have lower GPAs on average. The empirical model is given by:
GPAi = X
0
i±0 + ±1SEfather only + ±2SEmother only + ±3SEboth parents + ²i (5)
where i indexes students. The dependent variable is the cumulative college GPA as of
November 2006. College GPA is measured out of a maximum of 4 points. The indicator
variables, SEfather only, SEmother only and SEboth parents, equal one if only the father or only
the mother or both parents are non-professional self-employed individuals.21 In order to
see if self-employed parents have di®erential e®ects on their sons' and daughters' GPAs,
equation (5) is estimated for the samples of men and women separately.
The explanatory variable set in equation (5) contains Xi, which is the vector of in-
dividual and parental characteristics, and ²i, the error term. If parents of students
with low GPAs took the unlikely path of becoming self-employed to secure the future
of their o®spring, then the indicator variables for parental self-employment, SEfather only,
SEmother only, SEboth parents are potentially endogenous to the GPA equation. In this case,
the coe±cient estimates of these variables are biased and inconsistent. We believe that
reverse causality of this kind is highly unlikely, because parents generally make their
occupational choices far before their children are enrolled in college.
Unobserved ability bias arises if the occupational choices of parents and parental abil-
ity, which is expected to be highly correlated with the o®spring's ability, are correlated.
More speci¯cally, if high-ability parents are less likely to be self-employed, the negative
coe±cients for the presence of self-employed parents are downward biased, and vice-versa.
We tackle this issue by including two proxy variables for unobserved ability, the SSE scores
21The omitted group is the students with no non-professional self-employed parent.
14of students and variables measuring parental education levels.
Table 3 shows the results of estimating equation (5) for two alternative speci¯cations
in three samples. The basic speci¯cation includes age, hours studied, and family income,
in addition to the indicators for non-professional self-employed parents.22 The extended
speci¯cation augments the basic speci¯cation with the SSE score (a proxy for ability),
indicator variables for the year of enrollment (or test year), SSE score and test year
interactions, seven indicator variables for college major, and two continuous variables for
parental education levels.23
Column 1 of Table 3 reports the estimates for the basic speci¯cation in the pooled
sample of men and women. The students with only a self-employed father earned on
average 0:23 point lower GPAs. The impact of having only a self-employed mother on
GPA is ¡0:18, yet not signi¯cant at conventional levels. Interestingly, students with two
self-employed parents earned on average 0:37 point lower GPAs than those of students
with no self-employed parents. The impact of having self-employed parents on GPAs is
not trivial. For instance, in standard deviation units, having only a self-employed father
or two self-employed parents is associated with 0:35¾ and 0:58¾ lower GPAs, respectively.
Columns 2 and 3 show that in the basic speci¯cation the self-employment statuses of
parents do not di®erentially a®ect men's and women's college GPAs, with one exception.
While the impact of having only a self-employed mother is not statistically signi¯cant in
the pooled or women's samples, for men having only a self-employed mother is associated
with on average 0.35 point lower GPAs than those with no self-employed parents. This
22Data on family income and number of hours spent studying are available for surveyed students only.
We include two indicator variables for the missing responses of the non-surveyed students.
23The year of college enrollment corresponds to the SSE year because in Turkey the SSE scores are
only valid for one year. The results are not a®ected if we include eight indicator variables for parental
education instead of two continuous variables.
15negative and signi¯cant e®ect on men may be due to the possibility that men are more
likely to emulate their mother if the only self-employed parent is the mother. This may
be true if there are di®erences in the intergenerational transfer of self-employment based
on the gender of self-employed parent and the gender of child.
Columns 4-6 present the results for the extended speci¯cation. The coe±cient esti-
mates of SEfather only, SEmother only, and SEboth parents are smaller in absolute value (¡0:09,
¡0:01 and ¡0:24, respectively) but the estimates of SEfather only and SEboth parents are
still highly signi¯cant in the pooled sample.24 The overall impact of having only a self-
employed father on GPA is driven equally by men and women. Both groups earned
on average 0.09 (s.e.=0.04) point lower GPAs compared to those with no self-employed
parents. Interestingly, the presence of only a self-employed mother or two self-employed
parents has a di®erential impact on the GPAs of men and women. Men who have only
a self-employed mother or two self-employed parents earned 0.26 (s.e.=0.09) and 0.32
(s.e.=0.09) points lower GPAs respectively. For women, the e®ects of having only a self-
employed mother or two self-employed parents on GPAs, reported in column 6 of Table
3, are insigni¯cant 0.07 (s.e.=0.14) and ¡0:13 (s.e.=0.12), respectively.
Smaller negative coe±cients of the variables measuring parental self-employment sta-
tus suggest that if we fail to control for individual and parental ability, the coe±cient
estimates for the variables accounting for parental self-employment are downward biased.
Unsurprisingly, the ability proxy, SSE score has a positive and signi¯cant e®ect on stu-
dents' GPAs.25 These downward-biased estimates imply a negative correlation between
24The ¯rst speci¯cation provides an upper bound to the causal e®ect of parental self-employment on
college GPA. The main idea of adding more controls to the basic speci¯cation is to tighten the upper
bound for the estimates.
25For the year 2002, the coe±cient estimate for the SSE score is highly signi¯cant at 0.012. For the
years 2003, 2004, and 2005, the impact of SSE score on a student's college GPA is also positive yet
16parental ability and self-employment, because students' ability measured by SSE scores
correlates positively with college GPA and there are intergenerational transfers in ability.
Columns 4-6 reveal that father's education does not have a statistically signi¯cant
e®ect on GPA. On the other hand, mother's education has a negative impact on GPA
in the men's sub-sample. If highly educated mothers are less likely to be stay-at-home
mothers, the negative impact of highly educated mothers may be due to less time devoted
to child development.
The F-test shows that the indicator variables for parental self-employment are jointly
signi¯cant in the GPA equation for all speci¯cations; i.e. H0 : SEfather only = SEmother only =
SEboth parents = 0 is rejected, except for the extended speci¯cation in the women's sample.
The OLS results suggest that the children of the self-employed have, on average, lower
GPAs even after controlling for ability bias.26 If we assume that they would follow their
parents' self-employment by either working for their family businesses or starting new
businesses, these students may have had fewer incentives to exert high e®ort even in high
school. This lack of incentive would then be re°ected in their SSE scores. To examine
this issue, we test whether the SSE scores di®er systematically between the o®spring of
self-employed parents and other parents for various parental self-employment structures.
The null hypothesis is that the di®erence between the average SSE scores of students
weaker.
26The lower GPAs of the children of the self-employed may result from students exerting lower e®ort
in college, which can be measured by the number of hours spent studying, attending classes etc. While
a detailed time use diary would be ideal to measure the e®ort in college, we use 413 (of 1,122) students'
responses to our survey question, \On average how many hours a day do you study?" as a proxy for
e®ort in college. The estimates of the e®ect of self-employed parents on the number of hours studied
is presented in Table B1 of Appendix B. While we ¯nd a negative statistically signi¯cant e®ect of self-
employed parents on the number of hours studied only for men with only a self-employed mother, the
number of hours studied, which is only available for 413 students, is not a perfect proxy for the e®ort in
college.
17with or without self-employed parents is not statistically di®erent from zero.27 If the null
hypothesis is rejected, the SSE scores of students with self-employed parents di®er from
those of other students and selection may be an important issue. Table 4 shows that even
though students with self-employed parents have slightly lower SSE scores, in each case
we fail to reject the equality of the average test scores between the students with and
without self-employed parents.28
So far we have considered linear regression-based methods in which the identi¯cation
of the \treatment" (the presence of non-professional self-employed parents) on college
GPA depends on the linear selection on observables. To examine the robustness of our
results we also use matching methods. Although both matching methods and regression-
based methods estimate the impact of a \treatment" under the assumption of selection on
observables, Black and Smith (2004) discuss two potential problems associated with the
use of linear regression methods in observational studies. First, the linear conditioning on
the observables may create bias due to misspeci¯cation of the functional form in a linear
regression-based model. Second, the linearity assumption may mask the failure of the
\common support" issue. The details on the matching algorithms used and propensity
score matching estimates appear in Appendix A. We ¯nd that our results are robust to
consideration of matching methods instead of linear regression-based models.
A. Isolating the E®ect of Parents with Professional Occupations
We next investigate whether having a parent with a professional occupation a®ects
27The groups are students with only self-employed fathers, only self-employed mothers, and two self-
employed parents. We exclude any professional self-employed parents.
28We also included the SSE score and parental self-employment interactions in our regressions. The
coe±cients of these interaction terms are not statistically signi¯cant.
18GPA. The data set allows us to di®erentiate between parents who are retired, unem-
ployed/out of the labor force, employees, non-professional self-employed individuals and
professionals.29 The professionals may be self-employed (those who have their own private
practices), employees (those who work, for instance, in a hospital or a law ¯rm), or both
self-employed and employees at the same time.
The treatment group in equation (5) includes students with two non-professional self-
employed parents (SEboth parents), students with only a non-professional self-employed
mother (SEmother only), and with only a non-professional self-employed father (SEfather only),
while in the last two cases the other parent can be retired, unemployed/out of the la-
bor force, employee or professional.30 The comparison group (i.e. students with no
SEboth parents, SEmother only or SEfather only) includes students who have: (i) two parents
with professional occupations; (ii) only a mother with a professional occupation and a
father who is either retired, unemployed/out of the labor force or an employee; (iii) only a
father with a professional occupation and a mother who is either retired, unemployed/out
of the labor force or an employee; and (iv) two parents who are any combination of retired,
unemployed/out of the labor force or employee.31 If having a professionally employed par-
ent correlates with GPA, the presence of professionally employed parents in the treatment
and the comparison groups may bias the estimates in Table 3.
In order to separate the impact of having a non-professional self-employed parent
from that of having a professionally employed parent, we recoded the parental occupation
29The self-employed group excludes professional self-employed parents. Professional self-employed
parents are, for instance, doctors, lawyers, and accountants.
30Eleven of those 1,122 students who have non-professional self-employed fathers have professionally
employed mothers, while ¯ve of those 1,122 students who have non-professional self-employed mothers
have professionally employed fathers.
31There are 34, 26, 181 and 414 students in groups (i)-(iv) respectively, a total of 655 students in the
comparison group.
19groups so that mother/father can either be non-professional self-employed, professional,
or other (retired, unemployed/out of the labor force, or an employee). This recoding gives
nine mutually exclusive, parental-matched occupational groups.
Table 5 shows the estimates for when we repeat the estimation exercise of Table 3
by including ¯ve more indicator variables for parental occupation (the comparison group
now consists of 414 students who do not have any non-professional self-employed or pro-
fessional parents) in the pooled sample. The coe±cients of SEfather only, SEmother only
and SEboth parents are una®ected when we include these ¯ve indicator variables. The ex-
tended speci¯cation of Table 5 indicates that the coe±cients of SEfather ^ Promother,
SEmother ^ Profather, Profather only, Promother only and Proboth parents are not statistically
signi¯cant at any conventional levels.32 Our results are robust when we isolate the e®ect
of the professionally employed parents from that of the non-professional self-employed
parents.
V. Parental Occupation and Post-Graduation Plans
In this section, we quantify whether di®erent parental employment statuses generate
di®erent post-graduation plans. To address this issue, the surveyed students were asked
to choose one of the following seven post-graduation plans: 1) work in the family business;
2) start a new business; 3) work as an employee; 4) ¯rst work as an employee and then
work for the family business; 5) ¯rst work as an employee and then start a new business
6) go to graduate school; or 7) other.
32Interestingly, for students who have a non-professional self-employed mother(father) and a profes-
sionally employed father(mother), i.e., SEmother ^Profather (SEfather ^Promother), the non-professional
self-employed parent does not have a signi¯cant negative e®ect, partly due to very small sample sizes:
there are 11 and 5 out of 1,122 students with SEfather ^Promother and SEmother ^Profather respectively.
20A. Determinants of Post-Graduation Plans
The model and the previous literature suggest that, if entrepreneurial tendencies are
passed on from parent to child, the children of self-employed people are more likely to be
self-employed after graduation. Equations for di®erent post-graduation plans of a student





ji + ²ji > 0] j = 1;:::;6; (6)
where PGPji for j = 1;:::;6 are indicator variables for six post-graduation plan categories
excluding \planning to be an employee." SEPji is a vector of explanatory variables
for di®erent parental self-employment statuses. Zi is a vector of additional exogenous
variables that would a®ect post-graduation plans. These variables are age, SSE score,
indicator variables for gender, year of enrollment, and interaction terms for SSE score
and year of enrollment. Equation (6) can be estimated as a multinomial logit model.
Table 6 shows the marginal e®ects evaluated at the sample means relative to the base
outcome \planning to be an employee." The SEPji includes two indicator variables:
SEfather only and SEboth parents.33 Students with only a self-employed father are 26 per-
centage points more likely to plan to work in their family businesses than to plan to be
employees. Strikingly, students with two self-employed parents are almost 62 percentage
points more likely to plan to work in their family businesses. Students with only a self-
employed father are 7 percentage points more likely to plan to be employees ¯rst and then
33These indicator variables take on a value one if only the father or both parents are non-professional
self-employed individuals. We cannot control for SEmother only since some of the dependent variables
(post-graduation plans) do not vary with the variable SEmother only, the indicator variable for having
only a self-employed mother. For the same reason, we cannot include the (F £ SEfather only) or (F £
SEboth parents) interaction terms.
21become self-employed after graduation.
Having self-employed parents not only increases the likelihood of a college student's
entrepreneurial intent, but also it decreases a student's probability of planning to invest
further in education. Having two self-employed parents decreases the probability of plan-
ning to go to graduate school by 37 percentage points, while having only a self-employed
father decreases the probability of planning to go to graduate school by 10 percentage
points. Women are less likely plan to work in the family business or start a new business
than to become employees. A rise in family income increases the probability of planning
to work in the family business.
In Table 6, the Â2-tests reveal that SEfather only and SEboth parents are jointly signi¯cant
at the one percent level. However, the choice-speci¯c (outcome-speci¯c) Â2-tests show
that these two variables are not jointly signi¯cant in the equation for planning to go to
graduate school and planning to pursue other future plans.34 To test the validity of using
a multinomial logit model, we use Hausman-McFadden's IIA test. The results in Table 6
show the IIA assumption is valid and that a multinomial logit model is appropriate.
B. Survey Non-Response Bias
A potential problem with the above estimates, which focus on the surveyed sample
only, arises from the possibility of survey non-response bias, a special type of sample-
selection problem. The distributions of parental occupations in Table 1 and Table 2
show that students with self-employed fathers are under-represented in the survey.35 The
dependent variable in our multinomial logit model, post-graduation plans, is only available
34Refer to Table 6.
35Thirty-eight percent of the surveyed students have self-employed fathers, while 50 percent of the
non-surveyed students have self-employed fathers.
22for the surveyed sample. Table 1 demonstrates that the surveyed and the non-surveyed
students are not identical along many other dimensions. Therefore, estimation results
based only on the surveyed sample may su®er from a survey non-response bias.
In order to account for this possible bias we estimate the following two-equation binary
response model with selection:
Si1 = 1[Z
0
i1±1 + ²i1 > 0] ¡ surveyed: (7)
Ei2 = 1[Z
0
i2±2 + ²i2 > 0] ¡ plan to be 1
st ¡ degree entrepreneur: (8)
We can estimate this two-equation model via a maximum likelihood procedure by
making two assumptions: (i) The latent errors, ²i1 and ²i2, are bivariate normally dis-
tributed with zero means, unit variances and a correlation coe±cient of ½1; and (ii) these
latent errors are independent of Zi1.36 Equation (8) is the structural equation of interest,
where Ei2 is a binary indicator that takes on a value of one if student i plans to be a ¯rst-
degree entrepreneur after graduation. Equation (7) is the selection equation, where Si1
is the survey response indicator and Ei2 is observed only when Si1 = 1. The explanatory
variable set in equation (8) contains Zi2, which is a vector of exogenous variables that
would a®ect post-graduation plans, such as parental self-employment, gender, gender and
parental self-employment interactions, age, SSE score, year of enrollment, and interaction
terms for SSE score and year of enrollment.
To identify possible survey non-response bias, we need at least one explanatory variable
in Zi1 of equation (7) in addition to the Zi2 of the structural equation. Otherwise, the
identi¯cation is from the nonlinearities in the probit equations. A potential identi¯er
36See Wooldridge (2002) for details on this model.
23should be correlated with whether a student is surveyed or not, but it should not a®ect
post-graduation plans directly. As mentioned in the data section, the probability of
responding to our in-class survey is expected to be higher for students who attend many
classes. Therefore, the students who take a heavier course load are more likely to appear
in our in-class survey.
We use individual current course load to identify survey response. However, students
who have entrepreneurial tendencies may consistently take fewer or more classes compared
to those lacking entrepreneurial intentions. In this case, using current course load to
identify the survey response equation without accounting for a student's average course
load may be problematic. To solve this problem, we also control for a student's average
course load both in the selection equation and in the structural equation. Even if a future
entrepreneur takes fewer classes each semester, accounting for the individual average
course loads, the current course load should not directly a®ect future plans. Moreover,
as Table 1 shows, current course load is clearly correlated with the probability of being
surveyed.
Whether a variable is a valid instrument is always open to debate. Nevertheless, we see
no reason to assume that the course load taken by a student at the beginning of the Fall
2006 semester, controlling for their average course load over their college career, should
a®ect a student's post-graduation plans (recorded in December 2006). An instrument is
strong if its coe±cient is highly signi¯cant in the survey response equation. Staiger and
Stock (1997) suggest that if the t-statistic for an instrument is above
p
10, it is considered
to be a strong instrument. If ½1 6= 0, students are non-randomly assigned to the surveyed
sample, and the standard probit estimation of the impact of self-employed parents on
entrepreneurial intent without correcting for survey non-response bias will yield biased
24and inconsistent estimates.
The estimation strategy can be summarized as follows: We estimate the selection
equation via probit and get b ±1 in order to construct the conditional densities, P(Ei2 = 1 j
Z1i;S1i = 1) and P(Ei2 = 0 j Z1i;S1i = 1). Then we estimate b ±2 and b ½1 via a maximum
likelihood model using P(Ei2 = 1 j Z1i;S1i = 1), P(Ei2 = 0 j Z1i;S1i = 1) and b ±1.
Table 7 shows the results of estimating the two-equation model described above for two
alternative speci¯cations. The ¯rst has an indicator variable (1 · SEParent) that takes on
a value of one if at least one parent is self-employed, while the second has two indicator
variables, SEfather only and SEboth parents, to control for self-employed parents. The ¯rst
and fourth columns of Table 7 present the coe±cients from the probit selection equation
(7). Students with at least one self-employed parent or only a self-employed father are
less likely to be in the surveyed sample. In the second speci¯cation, the Â2-test reveals
that the variables SEfather only and SEboth parents and their interactions with the female
indicator variable are jointly signi¯cant in both the selection and structural equations.
We ¯nd that women are more likely to be in the surveyed sample. Consistent with
our expectations, the coe±cient of the identi¯er variable, current course load, is positive
and highly signi¯cant in all speci¯cations (with t-values larger than
p
10). Interestingly,
students with heavier average course loads are less likely to be surveyed.
The second and ¯fth columns show the marginal e®ects after estimating (8) as a
probit model without accounting for survey non-response bias. Having at least one self-
employed parent, only a self-employed father or two self-employed parents increases the
probability of planning to be a ¯rst-degree entrepreneur by 26, 27 and 59 percentage
points, respectively. The impact of having two self-employed parents is the largest on
students planning to be ¯rst-degree entrepreneurs. For students with only a self-employed
25father or two self-employed parents, the self-employment statuses of the parents do not
di®erentially a®ect children's entrepreneurial intent by gender. Older students and women
are less likely to plan on becoming entrepreneurs.
The last columns of models 1 and 2 show the marginal e®ects after estimating the sec-
ond stage of the two-equation model. The coe±cients of (1 · SEParent) and SEfather only
are highly signi¯cant and much larger than those predicted from the models that do not
control for the survey non-response bias, while the coe±cient on SEboth parents is not af-
fected. The probability of ¯rst-degree entrepreneurial intent increases by 35, 35 and 59
percentage points for the students with (1 · SEParent), SEfather only and SEboth parents,
respectively. This increase is over and above the probability of the baseline outcome,
which is 20 percent.37 The negative impact of age and being female on planning to be a
¯rst-degree entrepreneur disappear when we correct for the survey non-response bias.
The Wald test statistics for the independence of latent errors, (H0: ½1 = 0), of the
selection and the structural equations are insigni¯cant for both models. Therefore, the
Wald tests of independent equations fail to reject the null hypotheses.38 This result
indicates that ignoring selection into the surveyed sample would not render the estimates
of the probit model for Ei2 equation biased and inconsistent, yet some of the estimates
do change after we account for survey non-response bias.
VI. Conclusions
This study provides evidence that parental self-employment and family businesses
signi¯cantly a®ect students' college GPAs. Our results suggest that GPAs of men with
37See Table 1.
38The correlation coe±cients in Model 1 and Model 2 are insigni¯cant.
26two non-professional self-employed parents or with only a non-professional self-employed
mother are the lowest. We ¯nd that parental self-employment has a di®erential impact
on men's and women's GPAs with one exception: having only a non-professional self-
employed father has a similar e®ect on the GPAs of both men and women. For women,
the impact of non-professional self-employed parents on their GPAs is not as strong: self-
employment statuses of parents have a negative statistically signi¯cant e®ect on their
GPAs only for those with only a non-professional self-employed father. The inclusion of
various controls reduces the negative impact on GPA of having only a self-employed father
by about half, while the negative impact on GPA of having two self-employed parents is
reduced by only one-third. We test the robustness of our results by applying propensity
score matching methods. The matching estimates are similar to those estimates that are
calculated using regression-based models.
An explanation for the lower GPAs of the children of self-employed parents is that
in the presence of self-employed parents and family businesses students have a larger set
of post-graduation options and are more likely to plan on becoming self-employed due
to intergenerational transfer of self-employment. Hence, these students may not exert as
much e®ort in acquiring the task-speci¯c career-oriented human capital taught in college.
When family businesses opt for employing their children with lower levels of human capital
instead of following a competitive hiring procedure, family businesses deviate from pro¯t-
maximizing behavior and internalize possible costs this may impose on their businesses.
Nepotism of this kind prevails very frequently in most countries and threatens the success
of family businesses and of economies.
The results also con¯rm that students with family businesses are more likely to have
entrepreneurial tendencies upon graduation. Children of the self-employed are much
27more likely to planning on joining their respective family businesses after graduation.
After accounting for survey non-response bias, the probability of having the strongest
entrepreneurial intent among students with at least one self-employed parent is almost
175 percent more than the baseline case. More interestingly, for students with two self-
employed parents, this probability is almost 300 percent more than the baseline case.
Children of self-employed parents are not only more likely to become self-employed upon
graduation, but they are also less likely to plan to attend graduate school.
Future research might investigate the role of sibling order and the number and gen-
der of siblings on post-graduation plans and college success. Preliminary results based
on this data set show that the presence and number of older male and female siblings
interact with the self-employment status of the parents to a®ect students' college success
and post-graduation plans. For instance, while having only older sister(s) increases the
college success of students with no self-employed parents, having only older sister(s) re-
duces college success of those with self-employed parents. Interestingly, having only older
brother(s) has no statistically signi¯cant e®ect on college GPAs of students without self-
employed parents, while having only older brother(s) raises the college GPAs of students
with self-employed parents.
Although cumulative college GPA serves as a good measure of college success, future
work might utilize the panel data on GPAs and consider the standard deviation of a
student's college GPA to measure consistency in reaching and sustaining target GPAs.
Another line of research would involve studying the dynamic behavior of college students
throughout college that accounts for changes in GPA.
Future studies may involve understanding the relative importance of nepotism, in-
tergenerational transfers of entrepreneurial ability, and level of access to managerial and
28industry-speci¯c human capital in generating these e®ects. The limitations of the data
set in the current study do not permit these analyses.
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31Table 1: Comparative Summary Statistics for Surveyed and Non-Surveyed Samples
All Surveyed Non-Surveyed
(n=1,122) (n=499) (n=623)
Variable mean (s.d.) mean (s.d.) mean (s.d.)
Cumulative GPA 2.42 (0.62) 2.54 (0.62) 2.31 (0.61)
Course Load 5.99 (1.57) 6.12 (1.28) 5.88 (1.76)
Average Course Load 5.72 (1.16) 5.75 (1.22) 5.71 (1.11)
Age 21.49 (1.60) 21.38 (1.67) 21.58 (1.52)
Female 0.49 (0.50) 0.57 (0.49) 0.43 (0.49)
Major:
Business Administration & Economics 0.11 (0.31) 0.08 (0.27) 0.13 (0.33)
Economics 0.12 (0.32) 0.14 (0.34) 0.11 (0.32)
Government 0.05 (0.21) 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.21)
Economics (Honors) 0.02 (0.12) 0.01 (0.11) 0.02 (0.13)
Business Administration
& Economics (Honors) 0.03 (0.16) 0.02 (0.15) 0.03 (0.18)
International Finance 0.12 (0.32) 0.10 (0.29) 0.13 (0.34)
International Relations 0.19 (0.39) 0.23 (0.41) 0.17 (0.36)
Business Administration 0.36 (0.48) 0.37 (0.48) 0.36 (0.47)
SSE Score 253.30 (62.26) 263.05 (58.77) 245.49 (63.90)
Entrance Year:
2002 0.30 (0.45) 0.23 (0.42) 0.36 (0.48)
2003 0.31 (0.46) 0.31 (0.46) 0.31 (0.46)
2004 0.27 (0.44) 0.27 (0.44) 0.26 (0.44)
2005 0.12 (0.32) 0.19 (0.39) 0.07 (0.25)
Post-Graduation Plans:
Work In Family Business 0.16 (0.36)
Start New Business 0.04 (0.21)
Work as Employee 0.20 (0.39)
Employee!Family Firm 0.07 (0.25)
Employee!New Firm 0.17 (0.37)
Graduate School 0.33 (0.47)
Other 0.03 (0.18)
Hours Studied 1.79 (1.07)
Mother's Education 11.55 (4.77) 11.45 (4.74) 11.64 (4.79)




Variable mean (s.d.) mean (s.d.) mean (s.d.)
Mother's Occupation:
Housewife or Does not Work 0.61 (0.48) 0.61 (0.48) 0.62 (0.48)
Retired 0.13 (0.33) 0.18 (0.38) 0.08 (0.27)
Works as an Employee 0.15 (0.35) 0.10 (0.30) 0.18 (0.38)
Self-Employed/Business Owner/Employer 0.06 (0.23) 0.06 (0.23) 0.06 (0.23)
Professional 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.22) 0.06 (0.23)
Father's Occupation:
Does not Work 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.10) 0.02 (0.12)
Retired 0.15 (0.35) 0.20 (0.40) 0.10 (0.30)
Works as an Employee 0.23 (0.42) 0.13 (0.33) 0.31 (0.46)
Self-Employed/Business Owner/Employer 0.44 (0.49) 0.38 (0.49) 0.49 (0.50)
Professional 0.16 (0.36) 0.27 (0.44) 0.07 (0.26)










33Table 2: Parents' Occupations Matched
Entire Sample
Father
Mother Does not Work Retired Employee Employer Professional All
Housewife/Does not Work 10 86 125 374 95 690
Retired 3 56 27 34 24 144
Employee 3 18 86 34 23 164
Employer 0 4 9 46 5 64
Professional 0 3 12 11 34 60
All 16 167 259 499 181 1,122
Surveyed Sample
Father
Mother Does not Work Retired Employee Employer Professional All
Housewife/Does not Work 3 48 32 141 81 305
Retired 2 39 11 18 21 91
Employee 1 12 17 6 14 50
Employer 0 1 2 21 4 28
Professional 0 2 1 5 17 25
All 6 102 63 191 137 499
34Table 3: The E®ect of Self-Employed Parents on College GPA
GPA
Basic Speci¯cation Extended Speci¯cation
All Men Women All Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Control Group Mean 2:548 2:451 2:646 2:548 2:451 2:646
[0.644] [0.644] [0.629] [0.644] [0.644] [0.629]
SEfather only ¡0:225¤¤¤ ¡0:179¤¤¤ ¡0:269¤¤¤ ¡0:095¤¤¤ ¡0:091¤ ¡0:089¤
(0.037) (0.054) (0.052) (0.034) (0.046) (0.049)
SEmother only ¡0:181 ¡0:349¤¤¤ ¡0:145 ¡0:014 ¡0:264¤¤¤ 0:074
(0.112) (0.088) (0.152) (0.101) (0.093) (0.146)
SEboth parents ¡0:375¤¤¤ ¡0:459¤¤¤ ¡0:252¤ ¡0:236¤¤¤ ¡0:316¤¤¤ ¡0:127
(0.082) (0.088) (0.137) (0.078) (0.090) (0.124)
Age ¡0:033¤¤¤ ¡0:031¤¤ ¡0:026¤ 0:015 ¡0:001 0:042¤¤¤
(0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.017) (0.015)
Income/1,000 ¡0:003¤¤¤ ¡0:003¤¤¤ ¡0:002¤¤¤ ¡0:002¤¤¤ ¡0:002¤¤¤ ¡0:0009
(0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Additional Controls y
Hours Studied Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SSE Score No No No Yes Yes Yes
Exam Year Indicators No No No Yes Yes Yes
Exam Score £ Year No No No Yes Yes Yes
College Major No No No Yes Yes Yes
Parental Education No No No Yes Yes Yes
F-stat [p-value] 15.43 12.53 8.49 4.63 6.14 1.40
[<.001] [<.001] [<.001] [0.003] [<.001] [0.243]
Observations 1,122 573 549 1,122 573 549
R2 0.111 0.118 0.110 0.372 0.384 0.410
NOTE: The dependent variable is the individual GPA. Standard deviations and standard errors are given in brackets
and parentheses respectively. The linearized standard errors are derived from a consistent variance-covariance matrix
using Huber-White sandwich estimators. ¤¤¤, ¤¤ and ¤ indicate respectively 1%, 5% and 10% signi¯cance levels. The
indicator variables for the Business Administration Economics Combined Honors major and test year 2002 are omitted.
ySee next page for the parameter estimates of these variables.
35Table 3 (continued)
The E®ect of Self-Employed Parents on College GPA
GPA
Basic Speci¯cation Extended Speci¯cation
All Men Women All Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hours Studied ¡0:029 ¡0:014 ¡0:018 ¡0:038 0:019 ¡0:022
(0.087) (0.027) (0.105) (0.074) (0.121) (0.090)
Hours Studied2 0:016 ¡0:014 0:021 0:018 ¡0:006 0:022
(0.017) (0.027) (0.020) (0.014) (0.023) (0.016)
Business Administration
& Economics ¡0:808¤¤¤ ¡0:807¤¤¤ ¡0:661¤¤¤
(0.085) (0.127) (0.103)
Economics ¡0:795¤¤¤ ¡0:690¤¤¤ ¡0:715¤¤¤
(0.081) (0.121) (0.106)
Government ¡0:568¤¤¤ ¡0:411¤¤¤ ¡0:601¤¤¤
(0.098) (0.147) (0.127)
Economics (Honors) 0:199¤¤ 0:366¤¤¤ 0:137
(0.078) (0.116) (0.112)
International Finance ¡0:814¤¤¤ ¡0:614¤¤¤ ¡0:924¤¤¤
(0.079) (0.124) (0.096)
International Relations ¡0:748¤¤¤ ¡0:518¤¤¤ ¡0:866¤¤¤
(0.076) (0.123) (0.091)
Business Administration ¡0:826¤¤¤ ¡0:704¤¤¤ ¡0:845¤¤¤
(0.072) (0.113) (0.086)
SSE Year 2003 0:379 0:432 0:305
(0.380) (0.590) (0.568)
SSE Year 2004 0:252 ¡0:137 0:084
(0.381) (0.582) (0.542)
SSE Year 2005 0:462 0:246 0:309
(0.487) (0.722) (0.714)
SSE Score 0:012¤¤¤ 0:011¤¤¤ 0:012¤¤¤
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
SSE Score £ Year 2003 ¡0:006¤¤¤ ¡0:006¤¤ ¡0:006¤¤
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
SSE Score £ Year 2004 ¡0:005¤¤¤ ¡0:004 ¡0:005¤
(0.001) (0.0003) (0.003)
SSE Score £ Year 2005 ¡0:006¤¤¤ ¡0:005¤ ¡0:006¤
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Father's Education ¡0:001 0:001 ¡0:001
(0.042) (0.005) (0.006)
Mother's Education ¡0:007¤ ¡0:011¤¤ ¡0:005
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
36Table 4: Testing the Equality of the SSE Scores by Parents' Occupations
Contrasts by Parental Self-Employment Status
Control Control vs. Control vs. Control vs.
Mean SEfather only SEmother only SEboth parents
SSE Score 256.408 6.118 25.490 5.622
f64.569g (3.877) (15.486) (9.765)
t-Stat 1.578 1.646 0.575
[0.115] [0.103] [0.565]
Observations 605 453 18 46
NOTE: Standard deviation is given in braces. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
p-values for t-stats are reported in brackets. Control group includes students who do not have
any self-employed parents. ¤¤¤, ¤¤ and ¤ indicate respectively 1%, 5% and 10% signi¯cance
levels.
37Table 5: The Impact of Professional Parents on College GPA
GPA
Basic Speci¯cation Extended Speci¯cation
(i) SEfather only ¡0:270¤¤¤ ¡0:091¤¤
(0.042) (0.038)
(ii) SEmother only ¡0:250¤ ¡0:056
(0.142) (0.126)
(iii) SEboth parents ¡0:418¤¤¤ ¡0:221¤¤¤
(0.082) (0.078)
(iv) SEfather ^ Promother ¡0:237 ¡0:071
(0.148) (0.104)
(v) SEmother ^ Profather ¡0:260¤¤ 0:007
(0.109) (0.116)
(vi) Profather only ¡0:127¤¤ 0:017
(0.059) (0.051)
(vii) Promother only ¡0:199 ¡0:031
(0.131) (0.141)
(viii) Proboth parents ¡0:179¤ ¡0:018
(0.101) (0.085)







Hours Studied Yes Yes
Exam Score £ Year No Yes
Exam Year Indicators No Yes
College Major No Yes
Parental Education No Yes
F-Statistics and p-values
Ho: (i)=...=(viii)=0 6.56 (<.001) 1.71 (.092)
Ho: (i)=(ii)=(iii)=0 16.91 (<.001) 3.48 (.015)
Ho: (iv)=...=(viii)=0 2.59 (.024) 0.16 (.978)
Ho: (vi)=(vii)=(viii)=0 2.66 (.047) 0.08 (.970)
Observations 1,122 1,122
R2 .129 .384
NOTE: The dependent variable is the individual GPA. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The linearized standard
errors are derived from a consistent variance-covariance matrix using Huber-White sandwich estimators. ¤¤¤, ¤¤ and
¤ indicate respectively 1%, 5% and 10% signi¯cance levels. The indicator variables for the Business Administration
Economics Combined Honors major and test year 2002 are omitted.
ySee next page for the parameter estimates of these variables.
38Table 5 (continued)
GPA
Basic Speci¯cation Extended Speci¯cation
Hours Studied ¡0:035 ¡0:048
(0.087) (0.075)
Hours Studied2 0:016 0:019
(0.017) (0.014)
















SSE Year 2003 0:370
(0.378)
SSE Year 2004 0:102
(0.379)
SSE Year 2005 0:274
(0.498)
SSE Score £ Year 2003 ¡0:006¤¤¤
(0.001)
SSE Score £ Year 2004 ¡0:004¤¤¤
(0.001)
SSE Score £ Year 2005 0:005¤¤
(0.002)




39Table 6: The Determinants of Post-Graduation Plans: Marginal E®ects after Multinomial
Logit
(Base Outcome=Plan to be an Employee)
Family New Employee! Employee! Graduate Other
Business Business Family Business New Business School
(i) SEfather only 0:265¤¤¤ 0:005 0:071¤¤ ¡0:019 ¡0:103¤ ¡0:037¤
(0.049) (0.004) (0.031) (0.012) (0.057) (0.027)
(ii) SEboth parents 0:616¤¤¤ ¡0:029¤¤¤ 0:148 ¡0:212¤¤¤ ¡0:367¤¤¤ 0:004
(0.104) (0.009) (0.097) (0.021) (0.051) (0.022)
Age ¡0:008 ¡0:004¤¤ ¡0:016 0:001 0:015 ¡0:002
(0.011) (0.002) (0.010) (0.005) (0.019) (0.003)
Female ¡0:078¤¤ ¡0:008¤ ¡0:020 ¡0:008 0:039 ¡0:003
(0.032) (0.004) (0.025) (0.013) (0.053) (0.012)
Income/1,000 0:0009¤¤¤ 0:0002 0:0002 0:0003 ¡0:0004 ¡0:0003¤¤
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.002) (0.0005) (0.0001)
SSE Score ¡0:008¤¤¤ ¡0:0008¤¤¤ ¡0:003¤¤¤ ¡0:0005 0:011¤¤¤ ¡0:001
(0.002) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.0008) (0.003) (0.008)
Year 2003 ¡0:539¤¤ ¡0:177 ¡0:015 ¡0:029 0:962¤¤¤ ¡0:023
(0.280) (0.233) (0.035) (0.038) (0.045) (0.041)
Year 2004 ¡0:283 ¡0:221 0:035 ¡0:077 0:530 ¡0:094
(0.241) (0.313) (0.024) (0.089) (0.633) (0.132)
Year 2005 ¡0:339¤¤ ¡0:021 ¡0:095 ¡0:043 ¡0:115 ¡0:147
(0.160) (0.027) (0.084) (0.038) (0.476) (0.164)
SSE £ Year 2003 0:007¤¤¤ 0:0007¤¤ 0:002 0:006 ¡0:012¤¤¤ 0:001
(0.002) (0.0002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.003) (0.001)
SSE £ Year 2004 0:005¤¤ 0:0007¤¤ 0:001 0:008 ¡0:007¤ 0:001
(0.002) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.009) (0.004) (0.001)
SSE £ Year 2005 0:006¤¤¤ 0:0005 0:002¤ 0:003 ¡0:006¤ 0:001
(0.002) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.009) (0.003) (0.001)
Â2 (Pr>Â2) 23,806 (<.001)
Pseudo R2 .152
Log Pseudolikelihood -727.35
Â2 Stat for (i)=(ii)=0 17,600
[degrees of freedom] [12]
(Pr>Â2) (<.001)
Choice Spec. Â2 Stat 53.94 4157.06 19.48 3,575 4.03 3.80
[degrees of freedom] [2] [2] [2] [2] [2] [2]
(i)=(ii)=0 (Pr>Â2) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (.133) (.149)
Hausman Tests Of IIA Assumption H0=Odds (Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are Indep. of Other Alternatives
Â2 df. (P > Â2) Evidence
Work in the Family Firm .000 2 >.999 for H0
Start a New Firm .000 1 >.999 for H0
Employee!Family Firm .000 2 >.999 for H0
Employee!New Firm .000 1 >.999 for H0
Graduate School .000 2 >.999 for H0
Other .000 2 >.999 for H0
Work as an Employee .000 2 >.999 for H0
NOTE: Standard errors are given in parentheses. The linearized standard errors are derived from a consistent variance-
covariance matrix using Huber-White sandwich estimators. ¤¤¤, ¤¤ and ¤ indicate respectively 1%, 5% and 10% signi¯-
cance levels. The indicator variable for test year 2002 is omitted. The results reported for the multinomial estimations
are marginal e®ects rather than coe±cients.
40Table 7: The Determinants of Entrepreneurial Intent Corrected for Survey Non-Response
Bias: Marginal E®ects After Maximum Likelihood Probit Model with Sample Selection
Model 1 Model 2
Pr(First-Degree Entrepreneur) Pr(First-Degree Entrepreneur)
Pr(Surveyed) Not Corrected Corrected Pr(Surveyed) Not Corrected Corrected
Current Course Load 0:089¤¤¤ 0:090¤¤¤
(0.026) (0.027)
(1· SEParent) ¡0:201¤ 0:262¤¤¤ 0:346¤¤
(0.122) (0.057) (0.142)
Female£(1· SEParent) ¡0:178 ¡0:023 ¡0:023
(0.158) (0.063) (0.094)
SEfather only ¡0:267¤¤ 0:273¤¤¤ 0:354¤¤
(0.116) (0.064) (0.162)
SEboth parents 0:153 0:595¤¤¤ 0:594¤¤¤
(0.268) (0.137) (0.159)
Female£SEfather only ¡0:089 ¡0:020 ¡0:026
(0.163) (0.064) (0.092)
Female£SEboth parents ¡0:518 ¡0:056 ¡0:062
(0.495) (0.098) (0.169)
Average Course Load ¡0:177¤¤¤ ¡0:018 ¡0:037 ¡0:182¤¤¤ 0:017 0:035
(0.041) (0.016) (0.430) (0.041) (0.015) (0.047)
Age 0:058¤¤ ¡0:026¤¤ ¡0:040 0:057¤ ¡0:024¤¤ ¡0:038
(0.030) (0.011) (0.028) (0.030) (0.011) (0.031)
Female 0:493¤¤¤ ¡0:094¤ ¡0:160 0.466¤¤¤ ¡0:089¤ ¡0:149
(0.107) (0.053) (0.152) (0.105) (0.052) (0.157)
SSE Score ¡0:002 ¡0:009¤¤¤ ¡0:014¤¤¤ ¡0:002 ¡0:010¤¤¤ ¡0:014¤¤
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006)
Year 2003 0:451 ¡0:757¤¤¤ ¡0:866¤¤¤ 0:501 ¡0:799¤¤¤ ¡0:891¤¤¤
(0.935) (0.172) (0.170) (0.923) (0.156) (0.155)
Year 2004 ¡0:756 ¡0:566¤¤ ¡0:689¤¤¤ ¡0:766 ¡0:591¤¤ ¡0:705¤¤¤
(1.03) (0.230) (0.266) (1.03) (0.233) (0.270)
Year 2005 ¡0:366 ¡0:362¤¤ ¡0:415 ¡0:334 ¡0:404¤¤¤ ¡0:431
(1.23) (0.146) (0.276) (1.23) (0.155) (0.296)
SSE £ Year 2003 0:0004 0:009¤¤¤ 0:012¤¤ 0:0001 0:009¤¤¤ 0:012¤¤
(0.0004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005)
SSE £ Year 2004 0:005 0:007¤¤¤ 0:010¤¤ 0:005 0:007¤¤¤ 0:010¤¤
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004)
SSE £ Year 2005 0:006 0:007¤¤¤ 0:009¤¤ 0:007 0:007¤¤¤ 0:010¤¤
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004)
Number of Obs. 1,108 485 1,108 1,108 485 1,108
Censored Obs. 623 623 623 623
Uncensored Obs. 485 485 485 485
Log pseudolikelihood -891.1 -191.3 -891.1 -885.2 -186.2 -885.2
b ½ (s.e.) ¡0:323 (0.703) ¡0:303 (0.766)
Wald Test for Indep. Eqns.
(½ = 0) Â2(1) (p-value) .18 (.66) .14 (.71)
Â2-Stat for SE Parent 32.81 31.77 32.81
Dummies (p-value) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001)
Â2-Stat for SE Parent 57.23 43.45 57.23 64.52 53.08 64.52
Dummies£Female (p-value) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001)
NOTE: Standard errors are given in parentheses. The linearized standard errors are derived from a consistent variance-
covariance matrix using Huber-White sandwich estimators. ¤¤¤, ¤¤ and ¤ indicate respectively 1%, 5% and 10% signif-
icance levels. The indicator variable for test year 2002 is omitted. The results reported for the entrepreneurial intent
equation estimations are marginal e®ects rather than coe±cients, while the results for the survey response equation are
the coe±cients after probit estimation. 41Appendix A: Propensity Score Matching Methods
The basic idea of matching involves pairing \treatment" and \comparison" units that are
similar in terms of all relevant observable characteristics, X. In our context, the students
who have at least one non-professional self-employed parent constitute the treatment
group, while the comparison group includes those who do not.39
Matching based on observable characteristics is an attractive idea. However, for a
high dimensional X, conditioning on all observable characteristics makes it hard to ¯nd
matches for each cell, a problem known as the \curse of dimensionality." To solve this
problem, as proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), we use one-dimensional propensity
scores. Let the binary treatment indicator D equal one if a student has at least one non-
professional self-employed parent and zero otherwise.40 In our case, the propensity score
is the estimated probability of having at least one self-employed parent, P(D = 1jX) =
P(X), given the observed characteristics X.41 We use a probit model to calculate the
propensity score ^ P(X).
The main parameter of interest is the average e®ect of treatment on the treated, which
we denote ATT:
ATT = E(GPA(1) ¡ GPA(0)jD = 1) = E(GPA(1)jD = 1) ¡ E(GPA(0)jD = 1): (9)
39One could also consider a multiple treatment model (see Imbens [2000] and Lechner [2001] for
discussion) in which students with only a non-professional self-employed mother, only a non-professional
self-employed father, and two non-professional self-employed parents make up three treatment groups,
while those with no non-professional self-employed parents make up the comparison group. We limit our
attention to the binary treatment case to keep the model simple.
40Our de¯nition of self-employed parents excludes parents with professional occupations such as doc-
tors, lawyers, and accountants. To save space we use \self-employed" instead of \non-professional self-
employed."
41X is a vector of observed covariates a®ecting both college GPA and the treatment.
42While the ¯rst term E(GPA(1)jD = 1) is observed, E(GPA(0)jD = 1) is not observed.
Under the conditional independence assumption (CIA) one can replace E(GPA(0)jD = 1)
with E(GPA(0)jD = 0).
The CIA states that the treatment status is random conditional on the propensity
score, P(X).
GPA(0) ? DjP(X) (CIA): (10)
In addition, we make the common support assumption (CSA):
0 < P(D = 1jX) < 1 for all X (CSA): (11)
The CSA implies that for matching to be implemented, we should not have persons with
some characteristics X always or never appear in the treated group.
Given that CIA and CSA hold, one can write the propensity score matching (PSM)
estimator for ATT in equation (9) as follows42:
ATTPSM = EP(X)jD=1
©
E[GPA(1)jD = 1;P(X)] ¡ E[GPA(0)jD = 0;P(X)]
ª
: (12)
There are a variety of PSM estimators.43 Asymptotically, di®erent matching algo-
rithms yield the same estimates; however, in ¯nite samples they may generate di®erent
estimates. To test the robustness of our results we use various PSM estimators: the
42For detailed discussion of PSM, see for example Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), Heckman, Ichimura
and Todd (1997, 1998), Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998), Hirano, Imbens and Ridder (2003),
Imbens (2004), and Lechner (2001).
43See Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) for an extensive survey on the PSM methods.
43nearest neighbor(NN) estimator, the Gaussian and the Epanechnikov kernel estimators.44
In the NN matching framework bad matches are inevitable if the nearest comparison
group member, in terms of propensity score, is far away. To solve this issue and increase
the match quality we combine the NN estimator with a caliper and a radius. The caliper
describes a tolerance level around each treated unit within which the comparison unit
can be chosen.45 If there is no comparison group member within the caliper interval,
the treated observation is excluded from the estimation.46 Similar to caliper matching,
radius matching, as suggested by Dehejia and Wahba (2002), describes a propensity score
interval around each treated unit and uses all the comparison group members within each
caliper. Similarly, to avoid bad matches we combine kernel estimators with a bandwidth.
We calculate estimates by two di®erent caliper, radius and bandwidth sizes.47
Table A1 reports probit estimates for the presence of at least one self-employed parent
in three samples. Since the impact of treatment may be heterogenous between men and
women, we conduct matching on men's and women's sub-samples separately as well as on
the pooled sample.48 We empirically test the common support condition by examining the
estimated propensity score distributions for the treated and comparison groups. Figure
44See Becker and Ichino (2002) for the technical details on the NN and the kernel estimators. There is a
trade-o® between the bias and variance between two groups of estimators. To construct the counterfactual,
the NN estimator matches each treated student with a member of the comparison group who has the
closest propensity score. The kernel estimators, on the other hand, match each treated student with a
weighted average of several, even all, members of the comparison group. As a result, the NN estimator
implies lower bias and higher variance, while kernel estimators imply higher bias and lower variance.
45See Cochran and Rubin (1973).
46Excluding the treated observations that lack a comparison member within the caliper interval changes
the nature of the parameter estimated. In this case, the estimate gives the mean e®ect of the treatment
on the treated for those there are comparison group members within their caliper.
47Based on our inspection of the data and as suggested in Cochran and Rubin (1973) and Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1985), we use two caliper/radius/bandwidth sizes, 0.1 and 0.05.
48See, e.g., Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997, 1998) and Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd
(1998).
441 shows that the propensity score distributions for the treatment and comparison groups
are very similar and the common support condition holds.
Our PSM estimates of the impact of having at least one self-employed parent on
GPA appear in Table A2.49 As previously mentioned, we implement the NN estimator
combined with two caliper or radius widths and the Gaussian and the Epanechnikov kernel
estimators combined with two bandwidths. The OLS estimates, which are presented in
the ¯rst row, are statistically signi¯cant, ¡0:164, ¡0:155 and ¡0:164 in the pooled, men's
and women's samples, respectively. The PSM estimates ranging from ¡0:137 (¡0:089) to
¡0:183 (¡0:150) for women (men) are very similar to the OLS estimates. Moreover, the
estimates are not a®ected when we change bandwidth, caliper or radius sizes.
49We use the STATA codes by Becker and Ichino (2002) and Leuven and Sianesi (2003) to implement
PSM estimators.
45Table A1: Propensity Score Coe±cient Estimates
Pr(At least One SE Parent)
All Men Women
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept 8:778¤¤¤ 10:442¤¤¤ 7:632¤¤¤
(1.073) (1.523) (1.564)
Age ¡0:159¤¤¤ ¡0:224¤¤¤ ¡0:112¤¤
(0.031) (0.046) (0.045)
Mother's Education ¡0:004 ¡0:011 0:005
(0.010) (0.014) (0.015)
Father's Education ¡0:051¤¤¤ ¡0:048¤¤¤ ¡0:055¤¤¤
(0.010) (0.014) (0.014)
SSE Score ¡0:027¤¤¤ ¡0:029¤¤¤ ¡0:027¤¤¤
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Year 2003 ¡2:684¤¤¤ ¡3:187¤¤ ¡2:497¤
(0.946) (1.333) (1.378)
Year 2004 ¡2:553¤¤ ¡4:547¤¤¤ ¡1:001
(1.061) (1.523) (1.566)
Year 2005 ¡0:381 2:070 ¡2:127
(1.218) (1.921) (1.696)
SSE £ Year 2003 0:021¤¤¤ 0:023¤¤¤ 0:019¤¤¤
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007)
SSE £ Year 2004 0:020¤¤¤ 0:027¤¤¤ 0:014¤
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
SSE £ Year 2005 0:012¤¤ 0:004 0:018¤¤
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007)
Observations 1,122 573 549
NOTE: Probit models are used for estimation of the propensity score. Values in the
parentheses are standard errors. ¤¤¤, ¤¤ and ¤ indicate respectively 1%, 5% and 10%
signi¯cance levels. The dependent variable is a binary variable equal to one if the
student has at least one self-employed parent.
46Table A2: Propensity Score Matching Estimates:
The E®ect Self-Employed Parents on College GPA
All Men Women
(1) (2) (3)
OLS estimates ¡0:164¤¤¤ ¡0:155¤¤¤ ¡0:164¤¤¤
(0.034) (0.048) (0.050)
[n=1,122] [n=573] [n=549]
Nearest neighbor ¡0:113¤¤ ¡0:089 ¡0:176¤¤
(caliper=0.1) (0.054) (0.080) (0.084)
Nearest neighbor ¡0:113¤¤ ¡0:098 ¡0:177¤¤¤
(caliper=0.05) (0.055) (0.077) (0.080)
Nearest neighbor ¡0:164¤¤¤ ¡0:150¤¤¤ ¡0:183¤¤¤
(radius=0.1) (0.035) (0.052) (0.054)
Nearest neighbor ¡0:157¤¤¤ ¡0:149¤¤¤ ¡0:183¤¤¤
(radius=0.05) (0.038) (0.053) (0.055)
Gaussian kernel ¡0:164¤¤¤ ¡0:150¤¤¤ ¡0:168¤¤¤
(bandwidth=0.1) (0.036) (0.046) (0.050)
Gaussian kernel ¡0:148¤¤¤ ¡0:139¤¤¤ ¡0:145¤¤¤
(bandwidth=0.05) (0.036) (0.051) (0.053)
Epanechnikov kernel ¡0:146¤¤¤ ¡0:138¤¤¤ ¡0:144¤¤¤
(bandwidth=0.1) (0.037) (0.051) (0.055)
Epanechnikov kernel ¡0:143¤¤¤ ¡0:139¤¤¤ ¡0:137¤¤¤
(bandwidth=0.05) (0.038) (0.052) (0.056)
NOTE: There are 605 observations in comparison group and 517 in the treatment group for the pooled sample, and
there are 304 (301) observations in the comparison group and 269 (248) observations in the treatment group for men
(women). We use the bootstrap method to derive standard errors for the PSM estimators. Bootstrap standard errors
based on 1,000 replications appear in parentheses below each estimate. ¤¤¤, ¤¤ and ¤ indicate respectively 1%, 5%
and 10% signi¯cance levels. The variables included in the propensity score estimation are age, mother's education,
father's education, SSE score, year of entrance, and SSE score and year of entrance interactions. The NN (random
draw) estimator implements matching with replacement.
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48Appendix B:
Table B1: The E®ect of Self-Employed Parents on the Number of Hours Studied
Number of Hours Studied
Basic Speci¯cation Extended Speci¯cation
All Men Women All Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Control group mean 1:783 1:621 1:893 1:783 1:621 1:893
[1.090] [0.983] [1.146] [1.090] [0.983] [1.146]
SEfather only 0:050 0:213 ¡0:037 0:087 0:152 ¡0:034
(0.117) (0.175) (0.162) (0.123) (0.172) (0.185)
SEmother only ¡0:098 ¡0:682¤¤¤ ¡0:067 0:007 ¡1:032¤¤¤ 0:229
(0.417) (0.168) (0.494) (0.473) (0.314) (0.513)
SEboth parents 0:015 0:265 ¡0:250 0:068 0:292 ¡0:259
(0.187) (0.313) (0.195) (0.200) (0.340) (0.246)
Age 0:118¤¤¤ 0:083¤ 0:147¤¤¤ 0:136¤¤¤ 0:043 0:168¤¤¤
(0.036) (0.043) (0.052) (0.046) (0.061) (0.062)
Income/1,000 0:0004 0:001 ¡0:0006 0:0007 0:002 ¡0:0001
(0.0012) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Additional Controls y
Exam Year Indicators No No No Yes Yes Yes
Exam Score £ Year No No No Yes Yes Yes
College Major No No No Yes Yes Yes
Parental Education No No No Yes Yes Yes
F-stat [p-value] 0.11 12.21 0.55 0.18 5.62 0.46
[0.953] [<.001] [0.651] [0.909] [.001] [0.709]
Observations 413 174 239 413 174 239
R2 0.035 0.042 0.058 0.095 0.183 0.120
NOTE: The dependent variable is the number of hours studied. Standard deviations and standard errors are given in
brackets and parentheses respectively. The linearized standard errors are derived from a consistent variance-covariance
matrix using Huber-White sandwich estimators. ¤¤¤, ¤¤ and ¤ indicate respectively 1%, 5% and 10% signi¯cance levels.
The indicator variables for the Business Administration Economics Combined Honors major and test year 2002 are
omitted.
ySee next page for the parameter estimates of these variables.
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Business Administration & Economics ¡0:377 ¡0:437 ¡0:470
(0.378) (0.406) (0.655)
Economics ¡0:156 ¡0:029 ¡0:346
(0.385) (0.380) (0.681)
Government 0:284 0:838¤ ¡0:154
(0.450) (0.502) (0.752)
Economics (Honors) ¡0:284 ¡0:391 0:091
(0.394) (0.432) (0.666)
International Finance ¡0:413 ¡0:376 ¡0:497
(0.398) (0.464) (0.675)
International Relations ¡0:188 ¡0:316 ¡0:176
(0.389) (0.418) (0.667)
Business Administration ¡0:316 ¡0:500 ¡0:320
(0.373) (0.382) (0.661)
SSE Year 2003 3:986¤¤¤ 2:487 5:233¤¤
(1.527) (2.34) (2.176)
SSE Year 2004 3:242¤¤ 1:207 4:527¤¤
(1.560) (2.635) (2.176)
SSE Year 2005 0:693 ¡:467 1:070
(1.429) (2.196) (1.975)
SSE Score 0:011¤ 0:003 0:017¤
(0.006) (0.010) (0.009)
SSE Score £ Year 2003 ¡0:018¤¤ ¡0:009 ¡0:024¤¤
(0.007) (0.012) (0.010)
SSE Score £ Year 2004 ¡0:016¤¤ ¡0:006 ¡0:022¤
(0.007) (0.012) (0.010)
SSE Score £ Year 2005 ¡0:006 ¡0:0003 ¡0:010
(0.007) (0.011) (0.010)
Father's Education 0:007 0:010 ¡0:003
(0.014) (0.018) (0.020)




We ask you to participate in our survey that is designed to understand the student pro¯le. We want to
investigate the determinants of academic achievement of college students of one of the best universities
in Turkey. Please answer the questions correctly and as accurately as possible. The survey will take 5
minutes and your correct and full responses will help us to understand some student characteristics. No
information provided by you will be seen by third parties except the two main researchers and submitted
information will not be reported in a way that third parties can identify individuals. After matching the
student data with the academic records, the names will be erased.
1. First and last name:
2. School number:
3. Age: a)17 b)18 c)19 d)20 e)21 f)22 g)23 h)24+
4. Gender: a) MALE b) FEMALE
5. Please write number of siblings you have: I have .......Male;.......Female siblings.
6. Please write the ages of your BROTHERS (if it applies to you):...;....;....;....;....;....;....;....;....;....;....;.....
7. Please write the ages of your SISTERS (if it applies to you):...;....;....;....;....;....;....;....;....;....;....;....;.....
8. Does your family have any kind of business? a) YES b) NO
9. Did you go to the English Preparation class in University? a) YES b) NO
10. Not counting the English Preparation year, Fall 2006 is your......semester (please circle the correct
semester). a) 1st b) 2nd c) 3rd d) 4th e)5th f)6th g)7th h) 8 +
11. After graduating from college, I plan to:
a) Work in the family business.
b) Start a new business.
c) Work as an employee.
d) Work as an employee to gain experience ¯rst and then work in the family business.
e) Work as an employee to gain experience ¯rst and then start a new business.
f) Go to graduate school.
g) Other.
51Consider your answer to the previous question and please write your post-graduation plans if you
were asked these questions in the semester/time period below (Example: Ayse was planning to work in
the family business during her ¯rst year but she changed her plans in her second year and in the third
year with going to graduate school. In this case she would answer this question as follows:
1stY ear a 2ndY ear f 3rdY ear f )
Please leave it blank for the semesters you were not enrolled.
12. 13. 14.








15. If you have a family business, please write the total number of people (including those holding
managerial posts) working in this business:............
16. If you have a family business, please write the TOTAL number of people from the family who are
working in the business:............
17. If you have a family business, please write the number of people involved in it at managerial
positions who are NOT from the family:............
18. If you have a family business, please write the number of people who ARE from the family and who
work in managerial positions:............
19. Did you succeed in your ¯rst try at the University Entrance Exam (SSE)?
a) YES b) NO
20. What is your current GPA (as of the end of the last semester?) ...............
21. What was your English pro¯ciency when you completed high school?
a) Beginner. b) Intermediate. c) Advanced.
22. What was your university entrance exam score corresponding to the area (EQUALWEIGHT2)?
.................
5223. Please ¯ll in the circle corresponding to your major.
° International Relations ° Government
° International Finance ° Economics
° Economics (Honors) ° Business Administration
° Business Admin. and Economics ° Business Admin. and Economics (Honors)
Academic year fellowship/scholarship: Please circle the one ¯ts you for each time period.
Question Number! 24. 25. 26. 27.
2006/2007 2005/2006 2004/2005 2003/2004
a) No fellowships/scholarships. a) a) a) a)
b) Turkish Edu. Ministry b) b) b) b)
c) University Merit F. c) c) c) c)
d) University Sports, Art F. d) d) d) d)
e) Other Fellowships. e) e) e) e)
28. Pick the type of high school you graduated from:
a) Private (English as a 2nd Lang.) f) Public Anatolian (English as a 2nd Lang.)
b) Private (Other Lang.) g) Public Anatolian.(Other Lang.)
c) Private Science. h) Public Science.
d) Private Other. i) Public Super.
e) Regular Public (Straight.) j) Public Other.
29. Please rank the statement below from 1 to 5 (eg. 1= I totally disagree, 5=totally agree.)
² I take notes in classes:...................
² If you have a family business: I believe that my education will help me in the family business:..................
² If you are planning to start a new business: I believe that my education will help me in my future
business:..................
30. On average how many hours a day do you study?...........
31. On average how many hours a day do you sleep?.............
32. Which group does your yearly family income fall into?
a) 0-20 thousand YTL b) 20-40 thousand YTL c) 40-60 thousand YTL
d) 60-80 thousand YTL e) 80-100 thousand YTL f) 100-120 thousand YTL
g) 120-140 thousand YTL h) 140-160 thousand YTL i) 160+ thousand YTL
53Please choose the education level of your;
Question Number! 33. 34.
MOTHER FATHER
a) Grade school graduate/No formal Education. a) a)
b) Middle school graduate. b) b)
c) High school graduate. c) c)
d) University graduate. d) d)
e) Graduate school diploma. e) e)
Please choose the occupation of your...;
Question Number! 35. 36.
MOTHER FATHER
a) Housewife or Does not work. a) a)
b) Retired. b) b)
c) Wage earner, Works as an employee. c) c)
d) Self-Employed/Business owner/Employer. d) d)
e) Other Group/Professional e) e)
(Lawyer, Doctor, Auditor, Pharmacist etc.)
37. Please circle the option that applies to you. My parents are:
a) Divorced. b) Separated. c) Together. d) Other.
38. Who do you live with?
a) Both of my parents.
b) With my mother.
c) With my father.
d) My parents live out of Istanbul, I live in an apartment/dorm.
e) My parents live in Istanbul, but I live in a separate apartment/dorm.
f) Other
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